False flags : Bali : NY Times : more Matrix conditioning

2005-10-07

Richard Moore

    "It is only a matter of time before what you saw in Bali on
    Saturday night happens in a Western country," he said. The
    official spoke on condition that his name and country not be
    used, a condition imposed by most individuals of his position
    with access to intelligence information.

Why are they so knowledgeable about 'terrorist plans', and yet
never able to round up any of the suspects? Instead of always
saying, "an attack is expected", why never "arrests are 
expected"?  Intuitively, to me, the 'mindset' behind these
kinds of claims is that of a false-flag insider, not a genuine
hunter of terrorist cells. It's a subtle thing, about the choice
of emphasis and language. Just intuition. It's like on TV,
when the perp uses a slightly-off turn of phrase that starts
Columbo or Perot on the trail.
'
    The threads between the London, Madrid and Bali attacks are
    not organizational, he said: "They are threads of the mind."
        The  terrorists have a common world view, a shared ideology.
    There is no evidence of  outside direction, he said, and that
    makes fighting them challenging in a different way. He argued
    further that small attacks could add up to a devastation equal
    in some ways to large, catastrophic ones by eating away at
    people's security and at the economy.

Do people really believe this stuff? What could it be based on,
if it were genuine? How many suicide bombers have been 
interviewed on the couch? This is fantasy presented as news,
aimed at giving people a way to 'make sense' of incidents
which make no sense from any real terrorist perspective.

They tell us to expect attacks and when; they tell us the
psychology of the enemy; they benefit from the results.
They've had $billions and years to fight terrorism, with the
resources of the CIA, FBI, and everyone else, and yet they've
never achieved any breakthroughs in terms of stopping an
incident or breaking up a cell and getting some useful
testimony.

Q:  What's do terrorists and WMDs have in common?
A:  We don't know, we haven't found any yet.

Who do they think they're kidding?...too many, evidently.

rkm

--------------------------------------------------------
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/07/international/asia/07bali.html

October 7, 2005 

Bali Suicide Bombers Said to Have Belonged to Small Gang 
By RAYMOND BONNER 

JAKARTA, Indonesia , Oct. 6 - Indonesia's counterterrorism
forces say the suspected suicide bombers who carried out the
attack in Bali last Saturday appear to have been a small group
with no prior criminal record or link to a large organization
like Al Qaeda, giving the case echoes of the London subway
bombings in July.

A senior Indonesian counterterrorism official said Thursday in
an interview that the bombers seemed to have been "jihadists"
without previous involvement in terrorist acts that would have
brought them to the attention of the authorities.

A former senior member of Jemaah Islamiyah, the radical
Islamic organization here, who has defected and is helping the
government, said he did not recognize any of the men, the
official said. The heads of the presumed bombers were severed
in the blast, and pictures of them have appeared on television
and in newspapers. The official spoke on condition that he not
be identified, because he is not the authorized spokesman for
his agency.

The Bali attack, which in addition to the 3 bombers killed 19
people, most of them Indonesians, in separate explosions at
three restaurants, seems indicative of the way in which
terrorism is shifting, terrorism experts say.

It was less sophisticated, complex, costly and deadly than the
terrorist operation in Bali three years ago, in which a van
loaded with explosives exploded in front of a nightclub,
killing 202 people. And the organizations that financed the
earlier attack, Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, have been
severely weakened.

Yet the terrorist threat remains, while presenting a different
challenge from when Al Qaeda provided training, financing and
direction.

"Outside of the Middle East and North Africa, this is the
first time we have seen suicide bombers walk into a restaurant
and blow themselves up à la Israel ," said a senior Western
official who has closely monitored terrorist groups and
activities for the last four years.

"It is only a matter of time before what you saw in Bali on
Saturday night happens in a Western country," he said. The
official spoke on condition that his name and country not be
used, a condition imposed by most individuals of his position
with access to intelligence information.

The threads between the London, Madrid and Bali attacks are
not organizational, he said: "They are threads of the mind."

The  terrorists have a common world view, a shared ideology.
There is no evidence of  outside direction, he said, and that
makes fighting them challenging in a different way. He argued
further that small attacks could add up to a devastation equal
in some ways to large, catastrophic ones by eating away at
people's security and at the economy.

These attacks should be seen less as a change in  tactics than
"a demonstration of another capability," said a security
adviser with experience in the public and private sectors. He
declined to be identified, in part for security reasons and
because he has close ties to Western law enforcement agencies
that would not be as willing to share information with him if
they knew he talked to reporters.

In the London bombings it is not clear  who may have been
behind the bombers. Here, the main suspects as the masterminds
are Azhari Husin, a skilled bomb-maker, and Mohamad Noordin
Top, a charismatic recruiter and fund-raiser, who are thought
to be operating on their own.

In that sense, their personal terrorist trajectories mirror
the evolution of terrorism. They began as members of Jemaah
Islamiyah and acted on direction from Al Qaeda, but officials
here and elsewhere say they now form ad hoc groups to carry
out attacks.

They have a large pool of men to recruit from. Thousands of
young Indonesian men have been indoctrinated at religious
schools in hatred of the West and of Jews. Some 300 Indonesian
men trained in Afghanistan before the fall of the Taliban, and
another 300 or so have trained at Jemaah Islamiyah camps in
the Philippines . Training continues at the Philippine camps,
but on a smaller scale, the officials say.

As a teenager, Mr. Azhari, who was born in Malaysia , went to
Australia and studied at Adelaide University, where he showed
a greater interest in motorbikes, sports and partying than in
studying, Sally Neighbour wrote in "In the Shadow of Swords"
(HarperCollins, 2004), a compelling account of the Southeast
Asian terror network and the first Bali bombing.

He earned a doctorate from Reading University in England and
then returned to Malaysia, where he became a university
professor and acquired a reputation as an "irrepressible
joker," Ms. Neighbour wrote.

Along the way, Mr. Azhari  became a convert to fundamentalist
Islam. He fell in with Abu Bakar Bashir, the spiritual head of
Jemaah Islamiyah, who was then in exile in Malaysia, and
Riduan Isamuddin, better known as Hambali, who was Al Qaeda's
senior operative in Southeast Asia. Mr. Noordin was part of
the group.

In February 2002, Mr. Azhari and Mr. Noordin met with Hambali
in Bangkok and are said to have decided to go after "soft
targets," resulting in the first Bali attack. They were
financed by Al Qaeda, and Mr. Bashir endorsed the attack,
according to one of the men who carried it out and was later
captured.

The next big Azhari-Noordin operation is said to have been the
attack on the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003,
financed by Hambali and Al Qaeda. In the weeks before the
Marriott bombing, Mr. Azhari sat in the lobby sketching the
layout, according to the Indonesian police.

Days after the attack, Hambali was captured in a C.I.A.
operation in Bangkok and is now in C.I.A. custody at a secret
site. Mr. Bashir has been arrested and is in jail in
Indonesia.

Jemaah Islamiyah is a shadow of what it once was, officials
and experts say. "Its leadership has been decimated, it is
strapped for cash and it is riven by internal dissension,"
said Sidney Jones, who has written extensively about the
organization for the International Crisis Group. The main
faction of the organization does not agree with violent
terrorist acts, Ms. Jones said.

Mr. Azhari and Mr. Noordin have split off and continue to
operate. In September 2004, their target was the Australian
Embassy in Jakarta, according to the Indonesian police.

In making a recruiting pitch to a Muslim radical to take part
in the bombing, Mr. Noordin boasted that he was "the most
wanted man in Southeast Asia," Ms. Jones said.

Mr. Azhari drove the bomb-laden vehicle within a few hundred
yards of the embassy, the police have said, then got out and
hopped on a motorcycle, looking over his shoulder as the bomb
went off.

Reward Offered in 2002 Bombings

WASHINGTON, Oct. 6 (Reuters) - The United States offered a $10
million reward on Thursday for a major suspect in the 2002
Bali bombings, the second-highest bounty Washington is
promising in its effort to stem terrorism.

The reward for a tip that could help kill or capture Dulmatin,
an Indonesian militant believed to be hiding in the
Philippines, is exceeded only by the $25 million offered for 
Osama bin Laden and  Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company 
-- 


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