Project Armageddon: Israel’s Nuclear Capabilities (part 2)


Richard Moore

[Part 2]
One list of current reasons for an Israeli nuclear capability is:
          To deter a large conventional attack,
          To deter all levels of unconventional (chemical, biological, nuclear) attacks,
          To preempt enemy nuclear attacks,
          To support conventional preemption against enemy nuclear assets,
          To support conventional preemption against enemy non-nuclear (conventional, chemical, biological) assets,
          For nuclear warfighting,
          The “Samson Option” (last resort destruction).111
The most alarming of these is the nuclear warfighting.  The Israelis have developed, by several accounts, low yield neutron bombs able to destroy troops with minimal damage to property.112  In 1990, during the Second Gulf War, an Israeli reserve major general recommended to America that it “use non-contaminating tactical nuclear weapons” against Iraq.113  Some have speculated that the Israelis will update their nuclear arsenal to “micronukes” and “tinynukes” which would be very useful to attack point targets and other tactical or barrier (mining) uses.114  These would be very useful for hardened deeply buried command and control facilities and for airfield destruction without exposing Israeli pilots to combat.115  Authors have made the point that Israeli professional military schools do not teach nuclear tactics and would not use them in the close quarters of Israel.  Many Israeli officers have attended American military schools where they learned tactical use in crowded Europe.116
However, Jane’s Intelligence Review has recently reported an Israeli review of nuclear strategy with a shift from tactical nuclear warheads to long range missiles.117  Israel always has favored the long reach, whether to Argentina for Adolph Eichmann, to Iraq to strike a reactor, Entebbe for hostages, Tunisia to hit the PLO, or by targeting the Soviet Union’s cities.  An esteemed Israeli military author has speculated that Israel is pursuing an R&D program to provide MIRVs (multiple independent reentry vehicles) on their missiles.118
The government of Israel recently ordered three German Dolphin Class 800 submarine, to be delivered in late 1999.  Israel will then have a second strike capability with nuclear cruise missiles, and this capability could well change the nuclear arms race in the Middle East.119  Israeli rhetoric on the new submarines labels them “national deterrent” assets.  Projected capabilities include a submarine-launched nuclear missile with a 350-kilometer range.120  Israel has been working on sea launch capability for missiles since the 1960s.121  The first basing options for the new second-strike force of nuclear missile capable submarines include Oman, an Arab nation with unofficial Israeli relations, located strategically near Iran.122  A report indicates that the Israel Defense Ministry has formally gone to the government with a request to authorize a retaliatory nuclear strike if Israel was hit with first strike nuclear weapons.  This report comes in the wake of a recent Iran Shihab-3 missile test and indications to Israel that Iran is two to three years from a nuclear warhead.123  Israeli statements stress that Iran’s nuclear potential would be problem to all and would require “American leadership, with serious participation of the G-7 . . . .”124
A recent study highlighted Israel’s extreme vulnerability to a first strike and an accompanying vulnerability even to a false alarm.125  Syria’s entire defense against Israel seems to rest on chemical weapons and warheads.126   One scenario involves Syria making a quick incursion into the Golan and then threatening chemical strikes, perhaps with a new, more lethal (protective-mask-penetrable) Russian nerve gas if Israel resists.127  Their use would drive Israel to nuclear use.  Israeli development of an anti- missile defense, the Arrow, a fully fielded (30-50128) Jericho II ballistic missile, and the soon-to-arrive strategic submarine force, seems to have produced a coming change in defense force structure.  The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, quotes the Israeli Chief of Staff discussing the establishment of a “strategic command to . . . prepare an adequate response to the long term threats. . . ”129
The 1994 accord with Jordan, allowing limited Israeli military presence in Jordanian skies, could make the flying distance to several potential adversaries considerably shorter.130  Israel is concerned about Iran’s desire to obtain nuclear weapons and become a regional leader, coupled with large numbers of Shiite Moslems in southern Lebanon.  The Israeli Air Force commanding general issued a statement saying Israel would “consider an attack” if any country gets “close to achieving a nuclear capability.”131  The Israelis are obviously considering actions capable of stopping such programs and are buying aircraft such as the F-15I with sufficient operational range.  At the first delivery of these 4,000 kilometer range fighters, the Israeli comment was, “the aircraft would help counter a growing nuclear threat.”132  They consider such regional nation nuclear programs to be a sufficient cause for war.  Their record of accomplishment is clear: having hit the early Iraqi nuclear effort, they feel vindicated by Desert Storm.  They also feel that only the American and Israeli nuclear weapons kept Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from using chemical or biological weapons against Israel.133
Israel, like Iran, has desires of regional power.  The 1956 alliance with France and Britain might have been a first attempt at regional hegemony.  Current debate in the Israeli press considers offering Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and perhaps Syria (after a peace agreement) an Israeli nuclear umbrella of protection.134  A nuclear Iran or Iraq might use its nuclear weapons to protect some states in the region, threaten others, and attempt to control oil prices.135
Another speculative area concerns Israeli nuclear security and possible misuse.  What is the chain of decision and control of Israel’s weapons?  How susceptible are they to misuse or theft?  With no open, frank, public debate on nuclear issues, there has accordingly been no debate or information on existing safeguards.  This has led to accusations of “monolithic views and sinister intentions.”1360  Would a right wing military government decide to employ nuclear weapons recklessly?  Ariel Sharon, an outspoken proponent of “Greater Israel” was quoted as saying, “Arabs may have the oil, but we have the matches.”137  Could the Gush Emunim, a right wing religious organization, or others, hijack a nuclear device to “liberate” the Temple Mount for the building of the third temple?  Chances are small but could increase as radicals decry the peace process.138  A 1997 article reviewing the Israeli Defense Force repeatedly stressed the possibilities of, and the need to guard against,  a religious, right wing military coup, especially as the proportion of religious in the military increases.139
Israel is a nation with a state religion, but its top leaders are not religious Jews.  The intricacies of Jewish religious politics and rabbinical law do affect their politics and decision processes.  In Jewish law, there are two types of war, one obligatory and mandatory (milkhemet mitzvah) and the one authorized but optional (milkhemet reshut).140  The labeling of Prime Minister Begin’s “Peace for Galilee” operation as a milchemet brera (“war of choice”) was one of the factors causing it to lose support.141  Interpretation of Jewish law concerning nuclear weapons does not permit their use for mutual assured destruction.  However, it does allow possession and threatening their use, even if actual use is not justifiable under the law.  Interpretations of the law allow tactical use on the battlefield, but only after warning the enemy and attempting to make peace.  How much these intricacies affect Israeli nuclear strategy decisions is unknown.142
The secret nature of the Israeli nuclear program has hidden the increasing problems of the aging Dimona reactor and adverse worker health effects.  Information is only now public as former workers sue the government.  This issue is now linked to continued tritium production for the boosted anti-tank and anti-missile nuclear warheads that Israeli continues to need.  Israel is attempting to obtain a new, more efficient, tritium production technology developed in India.143
One other purpose of Israeli nuclear weapons, not often stated, but obvious, is their “use” on the United States.  America does not want Israel’s nuclear profile raised.144  They have been used in the past to ensure America does not desert Israel under increased Arab, or oil embargo, pressure and have forced the United States to support Israeli diplomatically against the Soviet Union.  Israel used their existence to guarantee a continuing supply of American conventional weapons, a policy likely to continue.145
Regardless of the true types and numbers (see Appendix A) of Israeli nuclear weapons, they have developed a sophisticated system, by myriad methods, and are a nuclear power to be reckoned with.  Their nuclear ambiguity has served their purposes well but Israel is entering a different phase of visibility even as their nuclear capability is entering a new phase.  This new visibility may not be in America’s interest.146  Many are predicting the Israeli nuclear arsenal will become less useful “out of the basement” and possibly spur a regional arms race.  If so, Israel has a 5-10 year lead time at present before mutual assured destruction, Middle East style, will set in.  Would regional mutual second strike capability, easier to acquire than superpower mutual second strike capability, result in regional stability?  Some think so.147   Current Israeli President Ezer Weizman has stated “the nuclear issue is gaining momentum [and the] next war will not be conventional.148
1.  Hersh, Seymour M.,  The Samson Option.  Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), 223.
2.  Aronson, Slomo and Brosh, Oded,  The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, the Opacity Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991-An Israeli Perspective  (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 20.
3.  Karsh, Efraim,  Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 82.
4.  Cohen, Avner,  Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 16.
5.  Cordesman, Anthony,  Perilous Prospects: The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 118.
6.  Pry, Peter,  Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1984), 5-6.
7.  Quoted in Weissman, Steve and Krosney, Herbert.  The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East.  (New York, New York: Times Books, 1981), 105.
8.  “Former Official Says France Helped Build Israel’s Dimona Complex.”  Nucleonics Week  October 16, 1986, 6.
9.  Milhollin, Gary,  “Heavy Water Cheaters.”  Foreign Policy  (1987-88): 101-102.
10.  Cordesman, 1991, 127.
11.  Federation of American Scientists,  “Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program.” 10 December 1997, n.p.  On-line.  Internet, 27 October 1998.  Available from
12.  Nashif, Taysir N.,  Nuclear Weapons in Israel (New Delhi: S. B. Nangia Books, 1996), 3.
13.  Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 48-49.
14.  Bennett, Jeremy,  The Suez Crisis.  BBC Video.  n.d.  Videocassette and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi.  Every Spy a Prince.  The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community.  (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 63-69.
15.  Weissman and Krosney, 112.
16.  “Revealed: The Secrets of Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal” (London) Sunday Times No. 8,461, 5 October 1986, 1, 4-5.
17.  Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 57-59.
18.  Peres, Shimon,  Battling for Peace.  A Memoir  (New York, New York: Random House, 1995), 122.
19.  Pry, 10.
20.  Loftus, John and Aarons, Mark,  The Secret War Against the Jews.  How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People  (New York, New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1994), 287-303.
21.  Green, Stephen,  Taking Sides.  America’s Secret Relations with a Militant Israel  (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1984), 152.
22.  Cohen, Avner,  “Most Favored Nation.”  The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 51, no. 1 (January-February 1995): 44-53.  
23.  Hersh, The Samson Option, 196.
24.  See Cohen, Avner,  “Israel’s Nuclear History: The Untold Kennedy-Eshkol Dimona Correspondence.”  Journal of Israeli History, 1995 16, no. 2, 159-194 and Cohen, Avner, Comp.  “Recently Declassified 1963 Correspondence between President Kennedy and Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion and Eshkol.”  Journal of Israeli History, 1995 16, no. 2, 195-207.  Much of the documentation has been posted to http:\
25.  Weissman  and Krosney, op. cit.,114-117
26.  Cohen, op. cit.,  Israel and the Bomb, 82-83.
27.  Spector, Leonard S.,  The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishers, 1988), 387 (n.22).
28.  Quoted in Stevens, Elizabeth.  “Israel’s Nuclear Weapons—A Case Study.”  14 pages.  On line. Internet, 23 October 1998.  Available from
29.  Green, Taking Sides, 148-179 and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, 1990, 197-198.
30.  Weissman and Krosney, 119-124.
31.  Black, Ian and Morris, Benny,  Israel’s Secret Wars.  A history of Israel’s Intelligence Services  (New York, New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 418-419.
32.  Hersh,  257.
33.  Green, Stephen,  Living by the Sword: America and Israel in the Middle East, 1968-1987  (London: Faber, 1988), 63-80.
34.  Cordesman, 1991, 120.
35.  Weissman and Krosney, 124-128 and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, 1990, 198-199.
36.  Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, 395(n. 57).98-199
37.  Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, 1990, 58.
38.  Milhollin, 100-119.
39.  Stanghelle, Harold,  “Israel to sell back 10.5 tons.”  Arbeiderbladet, Oslo, Norway, 28 June 1990 in: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Nuclear Developments,” 28 June 1990, 34-35; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from
40.  Hersh, op. cit., 139.
41.  Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  “Israeli Friends,” ISIS Report, May 1994, 4; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from
42.  Abecasis, Rachel,  “Uranium reportedly offered to China, Israel.”  Radio Renascenca, Lisbon, 9 December 1992 quoted in Center for Nonproliferation, “Proliferation Issues,” 23 December, 1992, 25; on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from
43.  Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, op. cit., 231-232 and 256-257.
44.  Nordeen, Lon O., Nicolle, David,  Phoenix over the Nile (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1996), 192-193.
45.  O’Balance, Edgar, The Third Arab-Israeli War (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), 54.
46.  Brecher, Michael, Decision in Crisis.  Israel, 1967 and 1973 (Berkley, California: University of California Press, 1980), 104, 230-231.
47.  Cohen, Avner.  “Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War.”  Middle East Journal 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 190-210.
48.  Creveld, Martin van.  The Sword and the Olive.  A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New York, New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 174.
49.  Burrows, William E. and Windrem, Robert, Critical Mass.  The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 282-283.
50.  Aronson, Shlomo,  Israel’s Nuclear Options, ACIS Working Paper No. 7.  Los Angeles, California: University of California Center for Arms Control and International Security, 1977, 3, and Sorenson, David S.,  “Middle East Regional Studies-AY99,”  Air War College: Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, 542.
51.  Hersh, op. cit., 126-128.
52.  Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, op. cit., 210-213.
53.  Spector, Leonard S.,  “Foreign-Supplied Combat Aircraft: Will They Drop the Third World Bomb?”  Journal of International Affairs  40, no. 1(1986): 145 (n. 5) and Green, Living by the Sword, op. cit., 18-19.
54.  Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 280.
55.  Cohen, op. cit.,  Israel and the Bomb, 237.
56.  Ibid.,  273-274.
57.  Milhollin, op. cit., 103-104.
58.  Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, Friend in Deed:  Inside the U.S.-Israel Alliance  (New York New York: Hyperion, 1994), 299.
59.  Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 464-465 and Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, op. cit., 1990, 304-305.
60.  Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 179.
61.  Dowty, Alan.  “Israel and Nuclear Weapons.”  Midstream 22, no. 7 (November 1976), 8-9.
62.  Hersh, op. cit., 217, 222-226, and Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 107.
63.  Green, op. cit., Living by the Sword, 90-99.
64.  Loftus and Aarons, op. cit., 316-317.
65  Smith, Gerard C. and Cobban, Helena.  “A Blind Eye To Nuclear Proliferation.”  Foreign Affairs  68, no. 3(1989), 53-70.
66.  Hersh, op. cit., 230-231.
67.  O’Balance, Edgar, No Victor, No Vanquished.  The Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, California: Presido Press, 1978), 175.
68.  Ibid.,  234-235 and Aronson, S, op. cit., 15-18.  
69.  Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 396 (n. 62); Garthoff, Raymond L.,  Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1994), 426, n76 and Bandmann, Yona and Cordova, Yishai.  “The Soviet Nuclear Threat Towards the Close of the Yom Kippur War.”  Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1980 5, no. 1, 107-9.
70.  Cherkashin, Nikolai, “On Moscow’s Orders.”  Russian Life, 39, no. 10 (October 1996), 13-15.
71.  Brownlow, Cecil.  “Soviets poise three-front global drive.  Nuclear weapons in Egypt, artillery buildup at Guantanamo, Communist concentrations in Vietnam aimed at political gains.” Aviation Week and Space Technology  99, no. 19 (5 November 1973), 12-14; Holt, Robert.  “Soviet Power Play.”  Aviation Week and Space Technology 99, no. 19 (5 November 1973), 7 and Gur-Arieh, Danny, “A non-Conventional Look at Israel During ’73 War.”  IsraelWire Tuesday, October 6, 1998 17, 23; on-line, Internet 20 November 1998, available from
72.  Hersh, op. cit., 321-235.
73.  Creveld, 1998, op. cit., 220-221.
74.  Evron, Yair, Israel’s Nuclear Dilemma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Publishing, 1994), 62-74.
75.  Cohen, Avner,  “Peres:  Peacemaker, Nuclear Pioneer.”  The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.  52, no. 3 (May/June 1996), 16-17 and Aronson, S, op. cit., 11-12.
76.  Karsh, op. cit., 86.
77.  Quoted in Hersh, op. cit., 180 and Stevens, op. cit., 1-14.
78.  Hersh, op. cit., 216, 276 and  Kaku, Michio.  “Contingency Plans: Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War.”  In Altered States: A Reader in the New World Order, Bennis, Phyllis and Moushabeck, Michel, Eds. (New York, New York: 1993), 66.
79.  Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 109.
80.  Gillette, Robert, “Uranium Enrichment: Rumors of Israeli Progress with Lasers.”  Science 183, no. 4130 (22 March 1974), 1172-1174.
81.  Barnaby, Frank, The Invisible Bomb:  The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East  (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), 25.
82.  “Israel: The Covert Connection.”  Frontline, PBS Network, May 16, 1989, quoted in Spector, Leonard S., and McDonough, Mark G., with Medeiros, Evan S.,  Tracking Nuclear Proliferation.  A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995).
83.  Nashif, Taysir N., Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Dimensions and Responsibilities (Princeton, New Jersey: Kingston Press, 1984), 22-23.
84.  Hersh, op. cit., 216.
85.  Barnaby, Frank,  “Capping Israel’s Nuclear Volcano,” Between War and Peace.  Dilemmas of Israeli Security, edited by Efraim Karsh (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 98.
86.  Hersh, op. cit., 271-275.
87.  Nashif, op. cit., 32.
88.  Gaffney, Mark, Dimona:  The Third Temple?  The Story Behind the Vanunu Revelation (Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1989), 100-101.
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90.  “Was there a Nuclear Test near Eilat?”  IsraelWire, 16 June 1998, or on line Internet, 22 November, 1998, available from and “Deputy Defense Minister Denies Israeli Nuclear Testing.”  Israeli Wire, June 18, 1998, or on-line.  Internet, 13 October 1998, available from
91.  McKinnon, Dan.  Bullseye One Reactor.  The Story of Israel’s Bold Surprise Air Attack That Destroyed Iraqi’s Nuclear Bomb Facility (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1987).
92.  “Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, Report on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Moscow, 1993.”  Journal of Palestine Studies XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 135-140; Creveld, Martin van,  Nuclear Proliferation and the Future Of Conflict  (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 105; and Clark, Philip. “ôThird successful Israeli satellite launch.”  Jane’s Intelligence Review 7, no. 6 (June 1995), 25-26.
93.  Sunday Times, London, op. cit., 1,4-5.
94.  Toscano, Louis,  Triple Cross: Israel, the Atomic Bomb and the Man Who Spilled the Secrets (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1990).
95.  Green, Living by the Sword, op. cit., 134.
96.  Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, op. cit., 165-166.
97.  Hersh, op. cit., 291.
98.  Levran, Aharon,  Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm: Lessons from the Second Gulf War (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 1-10.
99.  Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 278.
100.  Cohen, Avner and Miller, Marvin,  Nuclear Shadows in the Middle East: Prospects for Arms Control in the Wake of the Gulf Crisis (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990), 10.
101.  Aronson and Brosh, op. cit., 276.
102.  Raviv and Melman, op. cit., 399.
103.  Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 297n and Creveld, 1998, op. cit., 321-322.
104.  Levran, op. cit., 8-10.
105.  Ahmar, Moonis,  “Pakistan and Israel: Distant Adversaries or Neighbors?”  Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 1996, 20, no.1, 43-44.
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108.  Cohen, Eliezer.  Israel’s best defense: the First Full Story of the Israeli Air Force,  (New York, New York: Random House, 1993), 495.
109.  Cohen and Miller, op. cit., 18.
110.  “Before Meeting with King, Peres Claims Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal was built for Peace,” Jordan Times, July 14, 1998.  Quoted in Sorenson, op. cit., 542.
111.  Beres, Louis Rene,  “Israel’s Bomb in the Basement: A revisiting of `Deliberate Ambiguity’ vs. `Disclosure’, Between War and Peace:  Dilemmas of Israeli Security, edited by Efraim Harsh (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 113-133.
112.  Hersh, op. cit., 319.
113.  Amos, Deborah, Lines in the Sand: Desert Storm and the Remaking of the Arab World (New York, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 105.
114.  Dowler, Thomas W. and Howard II, Joseph H., “Countering the threat of the well-armed tyrant: A modest proposal for small nuclear weapons,”  Strategic Review, XIX, no. 4 (Fall 1991), 34-40.
115.  Beres, Louis Rene,  “Israel’s bomb in the basement: A revisiting of `Deliberate Ambiguity’ vs. `Disclosure.’ ”  In Karsh, Efraim, op. cit., Editor,  Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 116.
116.  Cordesman, op. cit., 1996, 265.
117.  Hough, Harold, “Israel reviews its nuclear deterrent,”  Jane’s Intelligence Review 10, no.11 (November 1998), 11-13.
118.  Creveld, op. cit., 1993, 105.
119.  Burrows, and Windrem, op. cit., 311-312 and “Israel begins test of nuclear missile submarines,”  The Irish Times, July 2, 1998, or on-line, Internet, 24 December 1998,  available from
120.  Melman, Yossi, “Swimming with the Dolphins,”  Ha’aretz, Tuesday, June 9, 1998, and “Report: Israel to get Subs with Nuclear Strike Capability,”  Jerusalem Post, I July 3, 1998, 3 and Sorenson, op. cit., 543.
121.  Raviv, Dan and Melman, Yossi, op. cit., 1990, 344-345, 422-423.
122.  Shahak, Israel,  Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign Policies (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 72-73.
123.  Davis, Douglas,  “Defense Officials Said Urging Nuclear Second-Strike Capability,”  Jerusalem Post, 6 August 1998, 3; or on-line, Internet, 22 November 1998, available from
124.  Inbar, Efraim, “Israel’s security in a new international environment,” in Karsh, Efraim, Editor, Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security (London, England: Frank Cass, 1996), 41.
125.  Hough, Harold,  “Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?”  Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1997, 407-410.
126.  Terrill, W. Andrew,  “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War.”  Comparative Strategy, 10 (1991), 109-119.
127.  Boyne, Sean, “Across the Great Divide.  Will Assad go for the Golan?”  Jane’s Intelligence Review, 10, no. 4 (April 1998), 21-24 and Cordesman, 1996, op. cit., 254.
128.  Cordesman, op. cit., 1996, 243.
129,  Harel, Amos and Barzilai, Amnon,  “Mordechai says Arrow alone cannot protect against missiles,”  Ha’aretz, 13 January 1999, or on-line,  Internet, 13 January 1999,  available from
130.  Shahak, op. cit., 78-79.
131.  Chubin, Shahram, “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?”  Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 91-93.
132.  O’Sullivan, Arich, “New F-15I Warplanes Expand Israel’s Reach,” The Jerusalem Post, 19 January 1997, or on-line, Internet 22 November 1998, available from
133.  Karsh, op. cit., 9.
134.  Shahak, op. cit., 4-5.
135.  Garrity, op. cit., 92-111.
136.  Dowty, op. cit., 8.
137.  Gaffney, op. cit., 165.
138.  Ibid., 37-38 and Friedman, Robert I.  Zealots for Zion:  Inside Israel’s West Bank Settlement Movement (New York, New York: Random House, 1992), 132-52.
139.  Blanche, Ed,  “Is the Myth Fading for the Israeli Army? — Part 1.”  Jane’s Intelligence Review, 8, no. 12 (December 1996), 547-550 and Blanche, Ed.  “Is the myth fading for the Israeli Army? — Part 2,”  Jane’s Intelligence Review 9, no. 1 (January 1997), 25-28.
140.  Cohen, Stuart A.,  The Scroll or the Sword?  Dilemmas of Religion and Military Service in Israel (Amsterdam, Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), 11-24.
141.  Creveld, op. cit., 1998, 298.
142.  Broyde, Michael J.,  “Fighting the War and the Peace: Battlefield Ethics, Peace Talks, Treaties, and Pacifism in the Jewish Tradition,” or on-line,  Internet, 20 November 1998, available from
143.  Hough, Harold, op. cit., 1998, 11-12 and Berger, Julian,  “Court Fury At Israeli Reactor.”  Guardian, 13 October 1997, in Center for Nonproliferation, “Nuclear Abstracts,” 13 October 1997, or on-line, Internet, 22 November 1998, available from
144.  Creveld, op. cit., 1998, 252.
145.  Valry, Nicholas,  “Israel’s Silent Gamble with the Bomb,”  New Scientist (12 December 1974), 807-09.
146.  Harden, Major James D.,  Israeli Nuclear Weapons and War in the Middle East,  Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1997.
147.  Dowdy, op. cit., 20.
148.  Aronson, Geoffrey,  “Hidden Agenda: US-Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question,” Middle East Journal, 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992), 619-630.
149.  Data from Time, 12 April 1976, quoted in Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 107.
150.  Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 280 and Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, op. cit., 273-274.
151.  Tahtinen, Dale R.,  The Arab-Israel Military Balance Today (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), 34.
152.  “How Israel Got the Bomb.”  Time, 12 April 1976, 39.
153.  Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 302.
154.  Kaku, op. cit., 66 and Hersh, op. cit., 216.
155.  Valéry, op. cit., 807-09.
156.  Data from CIA, quoted in Weissman and Krosney, op. cit., 109.
157.  Ottenberg, Michael, “Estimating Israel’s Nuclear Capabilities,” Command, 30 (October 1994), 6-8.  
158.  Pry, op. cit., 75.
159.  Ibid., 111.
160.  Data from NBC Nightly News, quoted in Milhollin, op. cit., 104 and Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 308.
161.  Data from Vanunu quoted in Milhollin, op. cit., 104.
162.  Harkavy, Robert E.  “After the Gulf War: The Future of the Israeli Nuclear Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1991), 164.
163.  Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 308.
164.  Albright, David, Berkhout, Frans and Walker, William, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996.  World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute And Oxford University Press, 1997), 262-263.
165.  Hough, Harold,  “Israel’s Nuclear Infrastructure,”  Jane’s Intelligence Review 6, no. 11 (November 1994), 508.
166.  Ibid., 262-263.
167.  Spector, and McDonough, with Medeiros, op. cit., 135.
168.  Burrows and Windrem, op. cit., 283-284.
169.  Cordesman, op. cit., 1996, 234.
170.  Ibid., 234.
171.  Ibid., 230, 243.
172.  Brower, Kenneth S., “A Propensity for Conflict:  Potential Scenarios and Outcomes of War in the Middle East,”  Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report no. 14,  (February 1997), 14-15.
173.  Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, op. cit., 262-263.
USAF Counterproliferation Center
The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1998 to provide education and research to the present and future leaders of the USAF, and thereby help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction.
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