CNS Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities


Richard Moore

Original source URL:

Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies

  CNS Special Report on North Korean Ballistic Missile Capabilities

March 22, 2006

Recent North Korean flight-tests of a new short-range ballistic 
missile have reinforced concerns about North Korea's missile program 
and its ability to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). North 
Korea has an array of short- and intermediate-range missile systems 
that can deliver conventional, chemical and possibly biological 
payloads. North Korea has not demonstrated the capability to deliver 
nuclear weapons with its ballistic missiles, but possibly could equip 
its medium-range Nodong missiles, which can reach Japan, with nuclear 
warheads. North Korea currently does not have an operational missile 
that can strike the United States.1 However, U.S. intelligence 
estimates of the untested Taepodong-2's range have increased in 
recent years. According to a former director of the U.S. Defense 
Intelligence Agency, a two-stage Taepodong-2 could theoretically 
strike "portions of U.S. territory" and a three-stage version could 
strike "most of the continental United States."2 At least two other 
mobile missiles are under development that would increase North 
Korea's military capabilities once they are deployed and operational. 
This special report answers key questions about North Korean 
ballistic missiles and presents CNS estimates of North Korea's 
ballistic missile capabilities. Although North Korea's cruise missile 
development poses an increasing threat, this report does not address 
Pyongyang's cruise missiles.

1. What can North Korea hit with its ballistic missiles? a) Can North 
Korean missiles strike the continental United States? North Korea 
does not currently have an operational missile that can strike the 
United States. The U.S. intelligence community estimates that a 
two-stage version of the untested Taepodong-2 missile could reach 
Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the western continental United States 
with a small high-explosive, biological or chemical payload, but 
probably not with a nuclear warhead. A three-stage version could 
theoretically strike all of the United Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies                                               March 22, 2006 
East Asian Nonproliferation Program States. 3 
Given the probable inaccuracy of the Taepodong-2, these payloads 
would be militarily insignificant. However, this missile could 
possibly threaten the populations of a few large West Coast cities. 
North Korea has not demonstrated the capability to make a nuclear 
weapon small enough to be part of a missile warhead or the capability 
to produce a reentry vehicle. North Korea would probably require 
several years and additional flight-tests to develop a reliable 
ballistic missile system capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to 
the continental United States. There are reports that North Korea 
could develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could 
strike most of the continental United States by 2015,4 but it is 
uncertain whether North Korea will have the resources and political 
will to sustain such a long-range development program.

b) Can North Korean missiles strike Japan? North Korea has two 
missiles, and possibly three, that can strike Japan. The Nodong could 
deliver conventional and WMD warheads throughout most of Japan 
(including several U.S. military bases). However, given the missile's 
relative inaccuracy, the Nodong is more useful as a "terror weapon" 
against population centers than as a significant military system- 
unless it is armed with a nuclear warhead. The Nodong is estimated to 
have a circular error probable (CEP) of 2-4 kilometers (km), which 
means half of the Nodongs fired would fall outside a circle of that 
radius.5 This poor accuracy means that North Korean efforts to strike 
U.S. bases in Japan would likely cause significant Japanese civilian 
casualties. The Paektusan-1 (also known as the Taepodong-1) is a 
two-stage missile with a Nodong as the first stage and a Scud variant 
as the second stage. The Paektusan-1 can strike anywhere in Japan's 
territory, but this system is even less accurate and less reliable 
than the Nodong. North Korea is also reportedly developing a new 
missile based upon the Soviet SS-N-6 (R-27) submarine-launched 
ballistic missile. The North Korean model, also known as the 
Taepodong-X, is a land-based mobile missile that uses liquid fuel and 
has an extended range of up to 4,000 km.6 In July 2004, South Korea's 
defense minister testified before the South Korean National Assembly 
that "North Korea was continuing engine tests and the development of 
this missile, and was in the middle of production and deployment."7 
This new missile could strike anywhere in Japan, but Pyongyang has 
yet to demonstrate its reliability through a flight-test.

c) What threat do North Korea's missiles pose to South Korea? North 
Korea has deployed the Hwasng-5 (Scud-B), which is capable of 
striking targets in about two-thirds of South Korea, and the 
Hwasng-6 (Scud-C), which can strike anywhere in South Korea. Both 
missiles can be armed with conventional or WMD warheads. Hwasng-5/6 
missiles could strike U.S. military bases in South Korea, as well as 
densely-populated urban areas, industrial complexes, ports, and even 
South Korea's 20 nuclear reactors. North Korea's Hwasng-5/6 missiles 
would most likely be armed with high-explosive or chemical warheads. 
Estimates of missile CEPs are difficult to calculate, but these 
missiles likely have a CEP of about 1 km and 2 km, respectively. In 
May 2005, and in March 2006, North Korea conducted flight-tests of 
the KN-02, which is a new solid-fuel mobile ballistic missile based 
on the Soviet SS-21 Scarab.8 The North Korean model is an improved 
version with a range of 100-120 km, which would enable it to strike 
the U.S. military installations at Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys 
in P'yngt'aek.9

2. How big is North Korea's missile arsenal? North Korea possesses 
more than 800 ballistic missiles, including "over 600 Scud missiles 
of various types and as many as 200 Nodong missiles."10 The 
distribution of Hwasng-5, Hwasng-6 and Scud-D missiles among this 
total is not clear. North Korea's historical production rate for Scud 
variant missiles is approximately seven to nine missiles per month. 
North Korea's historical production rate for Nodong missiles is one 
to three missiles per month. No reliable public data are available on 
the number of mobile launchers for North Korean Scud and Nodong 
missiles. North Korea flight-tested the Paektusan-1 on August 31, 
1998, but the missile has not been deployed.11 Furthermore, the 
Paektusan-1 has little strategic significance since it does not have 
the intercontinental range necessary to hit the United States. 
Pyongyang could have deployed a small number (less than 50) of North 
Korean SS-N-6 (R-27) or Taepodong-X missiles, but North Korea has not 
yet conducted a flight-test of this missile system. The Taepodong-2 
is still in the research and development stage and has not been 
flight-tested. There is little public information on KN-02 
deployments, but one analyst estimates the total number of deployed 
KN-02s and FROGs (free rocket over ground) as being "likely to exceed 

3. How hard would it be to attack North Korea missiles? U.S. and 
South Korean forces would have a difficult time locating and 
destroying North Korean KN-02, Scud, Nodong, and Taepodong-X (SS-N-6) 
missiles because of their mobility, quantity, and relatively short 
launch preparation times. These missiles can be launched from mobile 
erector and launcher systems, which could potentially be sheltered in 
underground facilities to avoid attacks. The Paektusan-1 and 
Taepodong-2 would be launched from fixed sites that are known to U.S. 
and South Korean forces. These missiles must be stored near the 
launch site, making them vulnerable to attack. Launch preparations 
for the Paektusan-1 and Taepodong-

2 could be readily detected by satellite surveillance, because the 
missiles would need to sit on fixed launch pads for at least a day 
prior to actual launch for fueling. Some reports suggest that North 
Korea plans to base Paektusan-1 and Taepodong-2 missiles in 
underground facilities, possibly near North Korea's border with 
China, in order to protect them from attack.13 If underground missile 
launch sites are not detected by U.S. or South Korean intelligence, 
North Korea might be able to launch long-range missiles with little 
or no warning. However, launching missiles from concealed underground 
launch sites would add significantly to the difficulty of deploying 
an operational long-range missile capability. If the United States 
were to conduct a preemptive strike against North Korean missile 
bases, it would likely be executed with sea-launched cruise missiles 
and precision-guided munitions delivered by U.S. military aircraft. 
Furthermore, the United States could employ its nascent missile 
defense system against North Korean missiles. The United States has 
deployed a Patriot missile brigade to South Korea,14 and is deploying 
ground-based missile interceptors in Alaska and California.15

4. Who supplied missile technology to North Korea? North Korean 
missile development programs have clearly benefited from foreign 
assistance. Cooperation with the USSR began in the early 1960s with 
transfers to North Korea of various weapons systems, such as 
surface-to-air missiles and unguided artillery rockets.16 North Korea 
was eventually able to obtain Soviet Scud-B missiles, but the timing 
and source of the acquisition are controversial. The general 
consensus is that North Korea received a few Scud-B (R-17) missiles 
from Egypt between 1976 and 1981.17 However, there are unconfirmed 
reports that the USSR delivered 20 Scud missiles in 197218 and about 
240 Scud missiles between 1985 and 1988.19 The Hwasng-5 and 
Hwasng-6 are reverse-engineered versions of the Soviet Scud-B and 
Scud-C. China assisted North Korea's early missile development 
efforts through the transfer of surface- to-air and anti-ship 
missiles. In the mid-1970s, Beijing and Pyongyang cooperated on the 
development of a 600-km-range mobile ballistic missile, but the 
program was cancelled in 1978 after North Korean engineers had 
received some training in missile design and development.20 Egypt and 
North Korea cooperated on the development of ballistic missiles in 
the 1970s and 1980s, but Cairo claims this cooperation has ended.21 
North Korea has received missile technology or materials-directly, 
inadvertently, or illicitly-from Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and 
Syria. North Korea has also benefited from Russian missile expertise 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

5. Which countries have imported North Korea missiles? Missile 
exports are a major source of foreign exchange for the North Korean 
government. According to a U.S. military source, North Korean missile 
exports to the Middle East during 2001 totaled about $580 million;22 
however, this figure has probably declined in recent years. North 
Korea's earliest and most loyal customer for missiles and missile 
technology has been Iran. In 1983 the two countries reached an 
agreement whereby North Korea provided Iran with technical assistance 
to establish a missile production facility.23 Between the late 1980s 
and mid-1990s, Pyongyang sold about 200-300 Scud missiles to Tehran, 
along with transporter erector launchers (TELs) and anti-ship 
missiles.24 North Korea also supplied Iran with a small number of 
Nodong missiles.25 Egypt has also received North Korean missiles and 
related technologies. Cairo reportedly acquired missile parts and 
production capabilities for the Scud-B (Hwasng-5) system from 
Pyongyang during the 1980s and 1990s.26 Unconfirmed reports from 2000 
and 2001 claimed that Egypt purchased complete Nodong systems and 
missile engines from North Korea.27 Pakistan has purchased North 
Korean missiles and technology; the Pakistani "Ghauri" missile is 
actually a renamed Nodong. Other countries that have purchased North 
Korean missiles, missile components, or missile technology include 
Libya, Syria, and Yemen.28

6. Did North Korea trade missile technology to Pakistan for nuclear 
weapons assistance? Reports indicate that in exchange for Nodong 
missile systems and technology, Islamabad provided Pyongyang with 
materials and/or technology for a secret program to produce highly 
enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used as the fissile material in 
nuclear weapons.29 North Korea delivered the missiles during 
1997-98,30 and Pakistan provided HEU materials and/or technologies as 
late as summer 2002.31 There are concerns that Dr. A. Q. Khan, the 
so-called "father of the Pakistani bomb," may have transferred 
nuclear weapons technology, particularly centrifuges, during a series 
of visits to North Korea beginning in the early 1990s.32

7. Will North Korea conduct more missile tests? North Korea has the 
capability to launch KN-02, Scud, Nodong and Taepodong-X missiles 
with little or no advance warning; however, flight-tests of the 
Paektusan-1 or Taepodong-2 missiles would require lengthy 
preparations that would be detected by U.S. and South Korean 
intelligence. Based on past North Korean behavior, any ballistic 
missile flight-tests would probably be timed to maximize their 
political impact on the United States, Japan, and South Korea. 
Additional flight-tests would be necessary to develop and deploy 
reliable long-range missile systems. Some analysts believe North 
Korea may be reluctant to flight-test its long-range missiles because 
a test failure (such as the failure of the third stage that occurred 
during the last test in 1998) might undermine the credibility of 
threats to use long-range missiles. Others believe Pyongyang is East 
Asian concerned that long-range missile tests will alienate key aid 
donors such as China and South Korea. In September 1999, North Korea 
agreed to suspend all ballistic missile flight tests while bilateral 
negotiations to improve U.S.-DPRK relations were underway.  However, 
the talks were suspended with the change of U.S. administrations in 
January 2001. Under the "Pyongyang Declaration" signed by Kim Jong Il 
and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi in September 2002, North Korea 
"expressed its will to extend its moratorium on missile tests during 
2003 and beyond." (33, 34)

However, North Korean diplomats have announced on occasion that the 
moratorium might be lifted or that it is no longer in effect.(35) It 
is unclear whether these statements indicate a reversal of policy or 
are part of North Korea's negotiation strategy.

8. What are the motives behind North Korea's development of missiles? 
North Korea's original motive for developing ballistic missiles 
likely followed Soviet doctrine by viewing missiles as a form of 
extended range artillery that can strike an enemy's rear area during 
a conflict.

Because North Korean doctrine envisions the use of chemical weapons 
in a major war, some of North Korea's Scud missiles and artillery are 
probably equipped with chemical warheads. North Korea's longer-range 
missiles-such as the Nodong, Paektusan-1, Taepodong-X (SS-N-6/R-27), 
and Taepodong-2-play a different role. By holding Japan at risk, 
North Korea probably hopes its missiles will prevent U.S. forces from 
using Japanese bases in the event of a future conflict. North Korea's 
efforts to develop nuclear weapons and ICBMs capable of striking the 
continental United States are likely intended to deter possible U.S. 
intervention or use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. In 
addition, exports of ballistic missiles and missile technology are 
one of North Korea's principal sources of hard currency. North 
Korea's past discussions with the Clinton administration about ending 
its missile exports and long-range missile development programs 
suggest that North Korea also regards its missile programs as 
bargaining chips that might be traded for economic assistance or 
security guarantees.(36)

9. What are the Chinese, Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. concerns 
about the North Korea missile threat?

Japan: Pyongyang's ballistic missile program has been regarded as a 
growing threat to Japan's national security since North Korea 
test-fired Nodong and Paektusan-1 missiles in 1993 and 1998, 
respectively.37 In 2003, North Korea was reportedly building two new 
missile bases for a modified land-based version of the Soviet SS-N-6 
(R-27), or so-called Taepodong-X.38 The bases were said to be 70-80 
percent complete in May 2004, but it is unclear if the missile 
systems expected to be deployed at these bases are (6) operational 
since they have never been flight-tested.39 When Prime Minister 
Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang for a summit meeting with Kim Jong Il 
in September 2002, North Korea promised to extend its missile 
flight-test moratorium beyond 2003. However, during bilateral talks 
in February 2006 aimed at normalizing relations between the two 
countries, a North Korean delegate suggested that Pyongyang might 
scrap the moratorium.(40)

In general, the Japanese government has been cautious in its 
reactions to North Korea's rhetoric and brinkmanship; however, 
Tokyo's patience has worn thin, partly because the Japanese public is 
upset at past North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens. Tokyo has 
demanded that the abduction issue be resolved before relations are 
normalized. Japanese leaders believe that, in the event of a military 
conflict, their country would be the primary target for North Korean 
missiles. Even without nuclear warheads, North Korean missiles could 
cause significant damage to Japan. Concerns about the North Korean 
missile threat have spurred Japanese interest in the possible 
development of offensive capabilities that could be used for 
preemptive strikes if a North Korean missile attack were imminent. A 
debate has emerged in Japan about possible efforts to amend Japan's 
constitution to allow the defense forces more flexibility, and even 
to reopen discussions about the once-taboo subject of a Japanese 
nuclear option. At the very least, Japan will continue its 
cooperation with the United States to develop and deploy missile 

United States: Although North Korean ballistic missiles have been 
cited as a primary justification for the development and deployment 
of missile defense systems, North Korea's current missile force does 
not yet pose a substantial threat to U.S. territory. The untested 
Taepodong-X (SS-N-6) could strike U.S. military bases in Okinawa and 
possibly Guam, and although the untested Taepodong-2 has the 
potential to hit the continental United States, its ability to 
inflict major damage is doubtful because it could deliver only a 
small warhead with poor accuracy at this range. A three-stage version 
of the Taepodong-2 could conceivably deliver a larger warhead, and 
possibly a nuclear warhead, to the continental United States, but the 
reliability of this missile system is unproven. Furthermore, the 
preparation time for a Taepodong- 2 launch is long enough to preclude 
a surprise attack, and North Korean launch facilities are vulnerable 
to a preemptive strike by U.S. forces. U.S. military planners are 
more concerned about attacks on U.S. forces based in Japan and South 
Korea, which are obvious targets for North Korean missiles and heavy 
artillery. The United States has about 32,000 military personnel in 
South Korea and about 47,000 troops(7) in Japan. Washington is 
concerned that North Korea might target U.S. forces or U.S. allies in 
Asia with missiles in the event of a military conflict, potentially 
limiting the U.S. ability to respond to a North Korean conventional 
attack. If North Korea could target the United States with nuclear 
weapons, U.S. military planners fear that Pyongyang might believe 
Washington would be deterred from fulfilling its alliance 
commitments, thus enabling aggressive North Korean military actions. 
North Korea's ability to strike South Korea and Japan with ballistic 
missiles also inhibits a U.S. preemptive strike against North Korean 
nuclear facilities. In addition to concerns about the political and 
military impact of North Korean missile capabilities, the United 
States is also concerned about exports of North Korean missiles and 
missile technologies to hostile states in other regions such as the 
Middle East.

South Korea: North Korean missiles are an immediate threat to South 
Korea's national security. One objective of Pyongyang's ballistic 
missile program was to obtain a missile capability that puts all of 
South Korea within range. South Korea has been exposed to the threat 
of Hwasng-5 and Hwasng-6 missiles since the 1980s. However, South 
Korea is equally concerned about North Korea's long-range artillery, 
which could inflict tremendous damage on Seoul with high-explosive or 
chemical shells. South Korea relies partly on the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella to deter a North Korean missile attack, but Seoul is also 
interested in developing independent capabilities to deter or respond 
to the North Korean threat. South Korea's missile development was 
limited by a 1979 agreement with the United States that prohibited 
the development of missile systems with a range greater than 180 
km.41 In 2001, South Korea and the United States reached a new 
agreement that allowed Seoul to build and deploy missiles with ranges 
up to 300 km and to conduct research and development on missiles with 
a range of more than 300 km. South Korea joined the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in March of the same year .(42)

South Korea has not been especially interested in acquiring ballistic 
missile defense systems, partly because these systems are expensive 
and they would do nothing to reduce Seoul's vulnerability to attack 
by North Korean artillery.

China: Although China still sees North Korea as an important security 
buffer, relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have cooled 
significantly over the last three decades. While it is highly 
unlikely that the DPRK would use its missiles against China, leaders 
in Beijing probably view the North Korean missile program with 
unease. The Chinese leadership is concerned that North Korean missile 
flight-tests will encourage the United State and Japan to accelerate 
efforts to deploy missile defenses in Northeast Asia. China is 
particularly worried about any missile defense system being extended 
for Taiwan's protection (8) because Beijing fears this might embolden 
pro-independence forces in Taiwan. China has about 600 short-range 
ballistic missiles located in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces opposite 
Taiwan in the belief that the missiles are a deterrent against a 
Taiwanese declaration of independence.43 China is also concerned that 
North Korean missile development could trigger an arms race and 
increased militarization in the region.

Russia: Russia is committed to a peaceful solution to the Korean 
Peninsula crisis. However, Russian military officials have quietly 
made it clear that they do have relevant forces to bring to bear 
against North Korea should Pyongyang's actions threaten Russian 
security. In mid-2003, for example, in an interview with the 
newspaper Izvestiya, a Russian Pacific Fleet officer mentioned that 
Russian sea- launched cruise missiles would be highly effective in a 
preemptive strike against North Korea's missile sites, if Russia 
believed that Pyongyang intended to use nuclear weapons.44 An ongoing 
Russian concern is that its Far Eastern region would suffer from 
radioactive fallout (or unintended strikes) if North Korea actually 
attacked the United States and Washington responded with nuclear 
weapons. Whether or not Moscow would in fact engage North Korean 
targets in such a crisis would likely depend on the specifics of the 
scenario. But the fact that Russian military officers have apparently 
discussed possible scenarios suggests that Moscow would not 
necessarily be a passive observer, as many observers might think, 
particularly if Pyongyang were the aggressor. The Russian 
military-to-military relationship with North Korea is no longer close 
and, through such activities as the Proliferation Security 
Initiative, Russian forces are gaining more experience in cooperative 
maneuvers with the U.S. military. On the other hand, Russian 
officials have made it clear that they would oppose any unprovoked 
U.S. strikes against North Korean missile sites or nuclear targets. 

[tables of capabilities in original - rkm ]

This special report was prepared by the East Asia Nonproliferation 
Program (EANP) at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey 
Institute of International Studies.

Contact information: EANP Director Daniel A. Pinkston Telephone: 
+1-831-647-4619 e-mail: •••@••.•••

North Korea is developing a new land-based version of the SS-N-6, a 
Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile. The estimated range of 
the North Korean model is 2,500-4,000 km. A North Korean missile 
would need a range of about 3,500 km to strike Guam.

These claims are unsubstantiated and cannot be verified since the 
missile is untested. See John J. Lumpkin, "Defense Official Says 
North Korea Can Arm Missile with Nuclear Weapon," Associated Press, 
April 28, 2005, in Lexis-Nexis,; David S. 
Cloud and David E. Sanger, "U.S. Aide Sees Arms Advance By North 
Korea," New York Times, April 29, 2005, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis,; Bradley Graham and Glenn Kessler, "N. 
Korean Nuclear Advance Is Cited; on Hill, Admiral Says Nation Can Arm 
Missiles," Washington Post, April 29, 2005, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis,

National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the 
Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001,; Vice Admiral 
Lowell E. Jacoby, "Current and Projected National Security Threats to 
the United States," Testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, March 17, 2005,; Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 
January 2001, p. 11,

General B.B. Bell, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, March 7, 2006, http://armed-; National 
Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic 
Missile Threat Through 2015, December 2001,

David C. Wright, "An Analysis of the North Korean Missile Program," 
Roundtable Paper, Appendix III, Commission to Assess the Ballistic 
Missile Threat to the United States (Rumsfeld Commission Report), 
July 15, 1998,; David 
C. Wright and Timur Kadyshev, "An Analysis of the North Korean Nodong 
Missile," Science and Global Security, Volume 4, 1994,

Joseph S. Bermudez, "North Korea Deploys New Missiles," Jane's 
Defence Weekly, August 4, 2004,; Andrew 
Feickert, "Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign 
Countries, CRS Report for Congress, March 5, 2004,; Yu Yong-wn, 
"Puk, 4000km sinhyng misail silchnbaech'i," Chosun Ilbo, May 4, 

Yu Yong-wn, "Puk, 3000-~4000km sinhyng misail silchnbaech'i," 
Chosun Ilbo, July 7, 2004,

"North's Missile a Modified SS-21," Joongang Ilbo, May 5, 2005,; 
Yonhap News Agency, March 9, 2006 in "ROK's Yonhap: N. Korean 
Missiles Merely Part of Regular Drill: Officials," OSC Document: 
KPP20060309971049; Kim Kwi-gn, "<Puk tonggyehullyn chung 
tan'grimisail palsa>," Yonhap News Agency, March 9, 2006,; "Hanmi, puk misail chngbopandan 
sigakch'a," Chosun Ilbo, May 6, 2005,

"Pukpalsa misail p'yngt'aekkkaji sajnggwn," Chosun Ilbo, May 4, 

General B. B. Bell, "Statement before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee," March 7, 2006.

Yu Yong-wn, "Puk, 4000km sinhyng misail silchnbaech'i," Chosun 
Ilbo, May 4, 2004,

Joseph S. Bermudez, "Moving Missiles," Jane's Defence Weekly, August 3, 2005.

"Pukhan chiha misail kiji chunggukkukkyng pu'gn'e knsl," Chosun 
Ilbo, July 7, 1999, in KINDS,; Kevin Sullivan 
and Mary Jordan, "North Korea Building New Missile Site, South Says," 
Washington Post, July 8, 1999, in Lexis-Nexis,

Franklin Fisher, "Rossi Takes Command of Army Patriot Missile 
Brigade," Pacific Stars and Stripes, July 17, 2005,; Franklin Fisher, "Deployment of Patriot 
Missile Battalion to S. Korea Is Complete," Pacific Stars and 
Stripes, December 1, 2004,

Wade Boese, "Missile Defense Funding Soars to New Heights," Arms 
Control Today, March 2006,; U.S. 
Missile Defense Agency, "A Day in the Life of the BMDS," March 15, 

Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's 
Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203- 207; Joseph S. 
Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the 
DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
November 1999, pp. 3-5; Chang Chun-iIk, Pukhan haek-misail chnjaeng 
(Seoul: Smundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247.

Yonhap News Agency, June 24,  1993, in "Defense Ministry Says 
Nodong-1 Test in May Successful," JPRS-TND-93-020, June 28, 1993, p. 
1; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile 
Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10; Joseph S. Bermudez, 
Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 
10, 1993, pp. 20, 22; Chang Chun-ik, Pukhan haek-misail chnjaeng 
(Seoul: 11
Smundang, May 1999), pp. 249-250, 257, 266; Yi Chng-hun, "FROGes 
taepodong kkaji: pukhan misail geim," Sindonga, August 1999, p. 202.

Interview with North Korean defector by Daniel A. Pinkston, senior 
research associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1, 
2000, Seoul.

SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 256.

Chang Chun-ik, Pukhan haek-misail chnjaeng (Seoul: Smundang, May 
1999), pp. 248-249, 265-266; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "Beijing's 
Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms Export Enigma," International 
Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40; Yi Chng-hun, "FROGes taepodong 
kkaji: pukhan misail geim," Sindonga, August 1999, pp. 201-202.

"Cooperation," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 244, June 22, 2001,; Janine Zacharia, "Mubarak Sees Hope for 
Progress under Sharon," Jerusalem Post, April 5, 2001, p. 2; "Speech 
by Egyptian President Mubarak to the Ad Hoc Committee of Arab 
American and American Jewish Leaders," Federal News Service, April 4, 
2001, in Lexis-Nexis,

Yoshiharu Asano, "N. Korea Missile Exports Earned 580 Mil. Dollars in 
'01," Yomiuri Shimbun, May 13, 2003, in Lexis- Nexis,

Korean Central News Agency, October 25-26, October 1983, in "Iranian 
Prime Minister's Visit to North Korea," BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, October 29, 1983, in Lexis-Nexis,; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic 
Missile Development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, October 1, 
1992, pp. 452-458; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic 
Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10.

Associated Press, "U.S. Says Iraq Trying to Buy Scud Launchers," 
Toronto Star, January 30, 1991, p. A30, in Lexis-Nexis,; Andrew Rathmell, with contributions by 
James Bruce and Harold Hough, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," 
Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No. 6, 1995, p. 20; Steven 
Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1991, 
p. A12.

"Puk, nodong 1 ho Iran chaegong/sajnggri 1 ch'n km sugi/mi ihoe 
pogos," Chosun Ilbo, 17 July 1993,; Douglas 
Jehl, "Iran Is Reported Acquiring Missiles," New York Times, April 8, 
1993, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis,; Joseph S. 
Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the 
DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
November 1999, p. 25; "Rodong 1 ho p'anmae/puk, Iran'gwa habi," 
Chosun Ilbo, August 5, 1994,

Korea Times, December 30, 1989, p. 4, in "Missile Cooperation with 
North Korea Alleged," JPRS-TND-90-002, January 17, 1990, p. 12; 
Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, July 
10, 1991, p. A12.

  "Arms Transfer Tables," Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Panning 
Policy, January 2002, in Lexis-Nexis,; Eli J. Lake and Richard Sale, "Egypt Buys 
Missiles from North Korea," United Press

International, June 18, 2001; Mikhail Falkov, "Jerusalem Attacks 
Cairo Via Washington," Novosti Nedeli, June 21, 2001, p.

11, in "Israel Said Using US Channels To Prevent Egypt's North Korean 
Arms Purchases," FBIS Document ID:

GMP20010625000058; "Cooperation," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 
244, June 22, 2001,

  Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, July 
10, 1991, p. A12; Con Coughlin, "Missile Deal

Puts Israel in Gaddafi Sights," Sunday Telegraph, Issue 1948, 
September 24, 2000,; "Libya

Acquires No-Dong Missiles from N. Korea," Middle East Newsline, Vol. 
2, No. 370, September 24, 2000,; Hugh Davies, "Protest to Libya after Scud 
Parts Are Seized," Sunday Telegraph, Issue 1690,

January 10, 2000,; "Ballistic Missile 
Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No.

10, October 1, 2000, in Lexis-Nexis,; Adel 
Darwish, "N. Korea 'Selling Scuds'," The

Independent, April 6, 1991, in Lexis-Nexis,; Bill Gertz, "China, N. Korea Secretly 

Missiles to Mideast via Cyprus," Washington Times, July 2, 1991, p. 
A4; Bill Gertz, "Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds

Near Gulf Ports," Washington Times, March 10, 1992, p. A3; Elaine 
Sciolino, "U.S. Tracks a Korean Ship Taking Missile to

Syria," New York Times, February 21, 1992, p. A9; "US to Release Ship 
with Missiles for Yemen," Xinhua News Agency, 11
December 11, 2002, in Lexis-Nexis,; "U.S. 
Piracy against DPRK Trading Cargo Ship

Condemned," Korean Central News Agency, December 19, 2002,

  Sharon Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North 
Korea and Paskistan," CRS Report for Congress,

March 11, 2004, 
<>; Dafna 
Linzer, "U.S. Misled Allies about Nuclear

Export; North Korea Sent Material to Pakistan, Not to Libya," 
Washington Post, March 20, 2005, in Lexis-Nexis,; Peter Slevin, "3 Nuclear Devices Cited in 
N. Korea," Washington Post, April 14, 2004, in Lexis-



  Ibid., Maggie Farley and Bob Drogin, "The Evil Behind the Axis?" Los 
Angeles Times, January 5, 2003, p. A1, in Proquest,

  James P. Rubin, Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, 
September 13, 1999,; "US Agrees to

Ease N. Korea Sanctions in Return for Missile Launch Halt," Agence 
France Presse, September 13, 1999, in Lexis-Nexis,; Philip Shenon, "North Korea Said to Agree 
to End Missile Tests," New York Times, September

13, 1999, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis,; Kim 
Yong-sik, "Background of DPRK Decision to Extend

Missile Launch Moratorium Explained", Donga Ilbo (Seoul), May 3, 
2001, FBIS Document ID: KPP20010503000123.

  "Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 

paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html; Howard W. French, "North Koreans 
Sign Agreement with Japanese," New York

Times, September 18, 2002, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis,; "DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration

Published," Korean Central News Agency, September 17, 2002,; "Talks between Kim Jong Il and

Koizumi Held," Korean Central News Agency, September 17, 2002,

  Barbara Demick and Paul Richter, "N. Korea May Test Missiles," Los 
Angeles Times, January 12, 2003. p. A.1, in

Proquest,; "Memorandum of DPRK 
Foreign Ministry," Korean Central News Agency,

March 3, 2005,; "Pyongyang Hints at Scrapping 
Missile Test-Launch Freeze Agreement," Jiji Press,

February 10, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis,; "Puk, 
misail palsa donggyl haeje sisa," Chosun Ilbo,

February 11, 2006,

  David E. Sanger, "Clinton Scraps North Korea Trip, Saying Time's 
Short for Deal," New York Times, December 29, 2000,

in Lexis-Nexis,; "U.S. Team Ends Talks in 
N. Korea; North Resists Halt to Missile Exports,"

Washington Post, April 1, 1999, p. A16, in Lexis-Nexis,; Son Key-young, "NK Rolls Out Red

Carpet for Perry," Korea Times, May 27, 1999,; Son Key-young, "NK Likely to Shelve 

Test If US Lifts Sanctions: Hall" Korea Times, August 30, 1999,; Philip Finnegan, "U.S.

Officials Seek To Build on N. Korean Missile Agreement," Defense 
News, October 4, 1999, p. 20; Kim Ji-ho, "Reported N.K.

Plan on Missile Export May Be Negotiation Ploy," Korea Herald, 
October 30, 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-; "North Korea Asks for US1 Billion to Halt Missile Sales," 
Channel NewsAsia, July 12, 2000, in Lexis-Nexis,; Son Key-young, "US, NK Discuss 
Missile-for-Satellite Exchange-Secretary of State Albright

Says," Korea Times, October 25, 2000,

  Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic 
Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995,

pp. 186-189; David E. Sanger, "Missile Is Tested by North Koreans," 
New York Times, June 13, 1993, p. 7; "North Korea

Seen Successful in Test of Nodong-1 Missile," Aerospace Daily, June 
29, 1993, pp. 538-539; Joseph Bermudez, "North

Koreans Test Two-Stage IRBM over Japan," Jane's Defence Weekly, 
September 9, 1998; Sandra Sugawara, "N. Korea Fires

Ballistic Missile toward Japan, Tokyo Reports; Pentagon Confirms 
Firing, Calling It 'Serious Development'," Washington

Post, August 31, 1998, p. A17, in Lexis-Nexis,; Yu Yong-wn, "Puk t'ando misail 
'taepodong 1
ho'/aekch'eyllyo sayong," Chosun Ilbo, September 2, 1998, p. 2, in 

  Joseph S. Bermudez, "North Korea deploys new missiles," Jane's 
Defence Weekly, August 4, 2004,

  Yu Yong-wn, "Puk, 4000 sinhyngmisail silchnbaech'i," Chosun Ilbo, 
May 4, 2004,

  "Pyongyang Hints at Scrapping Missile Test-Launch Freeze Agreement," 
Jiji Press, February 10, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis,; "Puk, misail palsa donggyl haeje sisa," 
Chosun Ilbo, February 11, 2006,

  Wade Boese, "U.S. and South Korea Hold Ballistic Missile Talks," 
Arms Control Today, November 1999,

  Yonhap News Agency, March 27, 2001, in "ROK's Yonhap: ROK Joins 
Missile Technology Control Regime," FBIS

Document ID: KPP20010327000035.

  Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress on the 
Military Power of the People's Republic of China,

July 2005,

  Russian Pacific Fleet officer, quoted in Oleg Zhunusov and Yelena 
Shesternina, "Russia to Join Talks on North Korean Issue," Izvestiya, 
July 31, 2003, pp. 1-2, Current Digest of the Post-Soviet

Escaping the Matrix website
cyberjournal website  
subscribe cyberjournal list     mailto:•••@••.•••
Posting archives      
   cyberjournal forum 
   Achieving real democracy
   for readers of ETM 
   Community Empowerment
   Blogger made easy